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THE DETERMINANTS OF VENTURE CAPITAL: 
A Panel Data Analysis of 16 OECD Countries 
 
Astrid ROMAIN





Abstract: The objective of this paper is to identify the main determinants of venture capital (VC). We 
develop a theoretical model where three main types of factors affect the demand and supply of VC. These 
factors are related to macroeconomic conditions, research efforts and technological opportunity, and the 
entrepreneurial environment. The model is evaluated econometrically with a panel dataset of 16 major 
OECD countries over the period 1990-1998. The estimates confirm that VC intensity is highly pro-cyclical - 
it reacts positively and significantly to GDP growth. Short-term (one-year) interest rates have a positive 
impact on VC intensity, which means that they affect more the demand side of VC (entrepreneurs) than the 
supply side. Indicators of technological opportunity, such as the growth rate of R&D investment, the stock of 
knowledge and the number of triadic patents affect positively and significantly the relative level of VC. The 
factors associated with the entrepreneurial environment also explain a substantial part of cross-country 
variations in VC intensity. An increase in corporate income tax rate has a negative effect on VC intensity. 
Labour market rigidities reduce the impact of the GDP growth rate and of the stock of knowledge, whereas a 
minimum level of entrepreneurship is required in order to have a positive effect of the available stock of 
knowledge on VC intensity. One important policy implication emerges from these results. It is not by 
providing money for VC that public decision makers will stimulate VC, but by providing knowledge and 
improving the entrepreneurial environment. 
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1. Introduction 
Venture capital (VC) is a financial intermediary that aims at fitting innovative start-up’s needs, mainly 
because these firms are generally associated with large growth potentials and high levels of uncertainty. A 
growing number of scholars have documented the positive impact that venture funds have on the probability 
of success of start-ups, as well as on the growth of their sales and employees
1. Most government bodies in 
industrialized countries now recognize the importance of VC as a factor of firm creation and sustainable 
growth. 
Despite this wide recognition of venture funds as key players underlying a country’s entrepreneurial 
performances, there are huge differences across industrialized countries in the relative amounts invested in 
VC. The level of VC intensity is relatively high in the USA and Canada for instance, whereas it is very low 
in Japan. The diversity of national financial systems is undoubtedly one important factor underlying these 
international differences. Other factors also play an important role, as shown by Jeng and Wells (2000) and 
Gompers and Lerner (1998). With a panel dataset of 21 countries Jeng and Wells show that labour market 
rigidities, the level of Initial Public Offerings (IPO), government programs for entrepreneurship, and 
bankruptcy procedures explain a significant share of cross country variations in VC intensity.  
The objective of this paper is to contribute to this recent stream of research in three ways. We first develop a 
theoretical model which takes into account the factors that affect the demand and supply of VC. These 
factors include the growth of GDP, short-term and long-term interest rates, several indicators of 
technological opportunity, and of entrepreneurial environment. Second, we exploit a panel dataset composed 
of 16 countries over a nine years period. Third, we investigate to what extent the level of entrepreneurship 
and of labour market rigidities affect the impact of the GDP growth rate and the stock of available 
knowledge on VC intensity.  
The results show that interest rates and the corporate income tax rate significantly influence VC intensity. 
The countries with lower labour market rigidities benefit from a higher impact of the GDP growth rate and 
the available stock of knowledge on the relative level of VC. Higher levels of entrepreneurship – i.e., the 
percentage of people being involved in a start-up – induce a positive and significant relation between the 
R&D capital stock and VC intensity. 
The paper is structured as follows: The next section summarizes the main findings of the few existing 
evaluation of the determinants of venture capital. A theoretical model of demand and supply of venture 
capital and the econometric model are developed in section 3. The empirical results are presented and 
interpreted in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature  review 
Few articles have so far focused on the determinants of VC. To the best of our knowledge, only two articles 
attempted to evaluate quantitatively the macroeconomic determinants of VC. Jeng and Wells (2000) develop 
a model aiming at identify the determinants of VC and test it on a cross-section of 21 countries over a period 
of 10 years. Gompers and Lerner (1998) focus on the US economy over the period 1969-1994. The main 
results are summarised in Table 1. 
                                                       
1 See Engel (2002), Hellmann and Puri (2002), Kortum and Lerner (2000), Romain and van Pottelsberghe (2003) for 
empirical evidence on the economic impact of VC.   3 
Table 1: Potential determinants of VC 
  Jeng and Wells (2000)  Gompers and Lerner (1998) 
  21 countries, 1986-1995  US, 1972-1994 
Potential Determinants    
Initial Public Offering   + Except for early stage funds  No effect at aggregate level 
Gross Domestic Product  Not significant  + 
Stock Market Opportunities
1 Not  significant  + 
Finance reporting standards  -  / 
Labour market rigidities 
Not significant for total VC investment but - 
for early stage funds 
n.a. 
Private pension funds 
(Level and growth of pension funds) 
+ Over time but not across countries 
(Dummy for changes in ERISA’s prudent 
man rule) 
+ 
Corporate Gains Tax Rate  Not significant  - 
Level of interest rate  n.a.  + At aggregate level and – at state level 
Industrial and academic R&D 
expenditures 
n.a.  + At the state level VC activity 
1. This variable is proxied by an indicator of market capitalization growth by Jeng and Wells (not significant, but probably correlated 




Initial Public Offering is considered as being a very important determinant of VC. It is the strongest driver of 
VC according to Jeng and Wells (2000) because it reflects the potential return to VC funds. Gompers and 
Lerner (1998) take it as a proxy for fund performance but cannot find any significant effect in their 
multivariate regressions. It seems that the IPO variable is strongly correlated with the expected return on 
alternative investments and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which also proxy exit opportunities. GDP 
and Market Capitalization Growth (MCG) are part of the impact of IPOs and therefore turn out to be not 
significant for Jeng and Wells (2000). However the reverse is true for Gompers and Lerner who find a 
positive and significant impact of Equity Market Return and GDP on VC but no impact of IPO. Higher GDP 
growth implies higher attractive opportunities for entrepreneurs, which lead to a higher need for venture 
funds. 
 
For Jeng and Wells (2000), getting the basic legal and tax structures into place appears to be an important 
factor influencing VC. Gompers and Lerner (1998) also recognize the importance of government decisions 
on the private equity funds. The labour market legislation is typically put in place to protect employees from 
arbitrary, unfair or discriminatory actions by employers. Some authors argue that venture financing can 
suffer from the rigidity of the labour market in Europe. Jeng and Wells (2000) show that it does not 
significantly influence total VC but affects negatively the early stage of VC investment. 
 
It has been widely accepted in the literature that VC investments in the US have been positively influenced 
by the clarification of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) “prudent man” rule of 1979. 
As a result pension funds started to invest substantial amounts of money into VC funds. In 1978 pension 
funds accounted for 15% of VC funds in the US and in the middle of the 80’s, the share had risen to more 
than 50 %. Jeng and Wells (2000) find that the level of investment by private pension funds in VC is a 
significant determinant of VC over time but not across countries. Gompers and Lerner (1998) use a proxy for   4 
the amendment of the “prudent man” rule to show the impact of pension regulation and came to the same 
conclusion. After 1979, the additional capital provided by pension funds led to a dramatic shift in 
commitments to VC. 
 
Concerning the impact of the Corporate Gains Tax Rate (CGTR) on VC activity, Gompers and Lerner (1998) 
reach the conclusion that a decrease in CGTR has a positive and important impact on commitment to new 
VC funds. In fact, they confirm the result of Poterba (1989) who built a model of decision to become an 
entrepreneur. He found that decreases in CGTR might increase the raising of VC funds not through 
stimulation on the supply side (i.e., the potential fund providers) but rather on the demand side. Indeed, 
decreases in CGTR often encourage entrepreneurship and thus the desire of people to create their own firm 
and to engage in R&D activities. Anand (1996, cited by Gomper and Lerner) also highlights the fact that the 
level and composition of investments appear to be negatively affected by increases in the CGTR but 
investments in one industry may be affected by myriad of other factors like technology shifts, tastes, etc. 
 
Both industrial and academic R&D expenditures are significantly related to venture capital activity at the 
State level in the model of Gompers and Lerner (1998). For them, the growth VC fundraising in the mid-
1990s may be due to increases in technological opportunities. 
 
Interest rates might also be an important factor influencing VC. Although Jeng and Wells (2000) do not take 
this factor into account into their cross country investigation, Gompers and Lerner (1998) show that it affects 
positively the demand for VC funds in the US. Economic theory would suggest a reverse relationship: if 
interest rates rise, the level of investment should fall. The positive impact estimated by Gompers and Lerner 
is probably due to the fact that they use a short-term interest rate. If short-term interest rates increase, the 
attractiveness of venture financing versus credit through usual financial institutions increases from the 
entrepreneur’s viewpoint. 
 
Some scholars have also focused on the micro determinants of VC. Gompers and Lerner (1998) show that 
the individual firm performance and reputation computed by firm age and size, positively impact the 
capacity to raise larger funds. Hellmann and Puri (2000) use a probit model to show that the strategy of a 
company is one of the determinants of VC investment when controlling for the age of the company and its 
industrial sector. If the strategy is an innovative one (the company is the first to introduce a new product or 
service on the market), it has a higher probability to benefit from VC compared to companies that follow an 
imitation strategy (the company uses existing technologies to develop and improve products and processes). 
They also find that innovating companies are able to raise VC earlier in their life cycle than companies with 
a strategy of imitation. In other words, their analysis suggests that VC is stimulated by technological 
opportunities. However there is less evidence of such a relationship at the aggregate macroeconomic level. 
In a nutshell, there are several potential determinants of VC. Some of them can be measured qualitatively or 
quantitatively at the macro level whereas others like the fund reputation and the strategy of the venture 
funded firms are microeconomic factors. In the next section we develop a theoretical model that takes into 
account the macroeconomic factors that might affect the demand and supply of VC.   5 
3. Modelling  the  amount of venture capital 
As Poterba (1989) and Gompers and Lerner (1998), we argue that changes in the level of VC funds come 
from changes either in the supply or the demand of VC. The demand comes from the entrepreneurs 
interested in setting up an innovative start-up. The supply of VC corresponds to the share of risk capital 
provided by private investors, pension funds and banks. The actual amount of VC invested represents the 
equilibrium between the demand and the supply of VC.  
The demand and supply of VC can be modelled through equations (1) and (2) that characterize the demand 
price of VC, P
d, and the supply price of VC, P
s, respectively. The supply price of VC is assumed to be a 
positive function of the available VC funds, the interest rate (r) and the corporate tax rate (TAX). The more 
VC is available on the market, the higher will be the supply price of VC, due to increasing marginal costs 
(avc>0). If interest rates increase we can expect the fund providers to increase their return requirement (ar>0; 
otherwise they would opt for alternative investments opportunities). Similarly, an increase in the corporate 
gains tax rate would increase the return requirements (atax>0). 
r a TAX a VC a a s
r tax vc C
VC P + + + =           ( 1 )  
r b TAX b EN b TO b Y b VC b b d
r tax en to Y vc C
VC P + + + + + + = ˆ
ˆ        ( 2 )  
The equation of the demand price of VC reflects the entrepreneurs’ viewpoint. Decreasing marginal returns 
to VC is assumed (the projects with the largest expected returns are selected first). The more VC is available 
the lower is the demand price of VC (bvc<0). The other factors that are assumed to influence the demand of 
VC are the GDP growth (Y), technological opportunities (TO), entrepreneurial culture (EN), level of 
corporate gains tax rate (TAX) and interest rates (r). The countries with a high GDP growth, large 
technological opportunities and a strong entrepreneurial culture are more likely to be associated with a strong 
demand for VC (and hence positive effects on the demand price of VC: bY>0; bTO>0; bEN>0). The general 
level of taxation will probably reduce the rate of entrepreneurship (the demand for VC and therefore btax<0). 
Concerning interest rates, we consider that innovative start-up’s need important amounts of money in the 
short-term. Therefore if the cost of capital increases entrepreneurs are more likely to switch from the banking 
sector to the venture fund providers (br>0).  
Equations (3) and (4) show the equilibrium level of VC that equalizes the supply and demand of VC. 
r a b TAX a b EN b TO b Y b a b VC b a r r it tax tax en to Y C C vc vc ) ( ) ( ˆ ) ( ) ( ˆ − + − + + + + − = −     (3) 
    increasing marginal cost of VC Investment 
where      decreasing  marginal  return 
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Since the denominator is always positive, the numerator provides the expected sign of the parameters 

















a  6 
expected to have a positive impact on VC. For interest rate (r), the impact is either negative or positive 
depending on the difference between the demand price effect and the supply price effect. If the demand price 
effect of a high interest rate is larger than its supply price effect, then the overall impact of interest rates on 
VC should be positive. The effect of the level of corporate gains tax rate on the equilibrium level of VC will 
always be negative since (btax – atax) is always negative.  
The empirical implementation of equation (4) is presented in equations (5) and (6). The growth rate of GDP 
allows testing the cyclicality of VC. Regarding interest rate we suspect that short-term and long-term interest 
rates could affect differently the venture fund providers and the ‘high-tech’ entrepreneurs. We therefore plan 
to use a short-term (one year, r
ST) and a long-term (ten years, r
LT) interest rate in the empirical model. 
Technological opportunity is proxied by three variables, the growth rate of business R&D outlays, the 
business R&D capital stock and the number of triadic patents. The growth rate of business R&D 
expenditures represents the research dynamics of a country. The business R&D capital stock is an indicator 
of the available stock of knowledge (or of the cumulated innovative efforts). The number of triadic patents is 
an indicator of innovative output. It measures the number of highly valuable inventions invented in each 
country (it is counted by country of inventor and by priority year). The entrepreneurial environment can be 
measured with three variables: level of taxation, entrepreneurial activity and labour market rigidity. The level 
of taxation is measured with the corporate income tax rate (CITR).  
The measures of entrepreneurial activity (TEA) and labour market rigidity (RIG) are indices that are only 
available for one year. We therefore introduce them in interaction with other variables. For instance, it is 
possible to test whether RIG would affect the impact of GDP growth rate on the intensity of VC. This is 
equivalent to test whether the impact of GDP growth rate on VC intensity is composed of a fixed component 
(β
c
∆ gdp) and a component that varies across countries according to the level of labour market rigidities (i.e., 
β ∆ gdp= β
c
∆ gdp + βrig ∆ GDP). Similarly, the level of entrepreneurship (TEA) could affect the impact of the 
available stock of knowledge, SBRD. These interactions are illustrated in equation (6). 
Model with no interaction 
it t i G
it r it citr it pat it sbrd it brd it gdp it
G
r CITR PAT SBRD BRD GDP VC
µ ϕ φ σ
β β β β β β
+ + + +
+ + + + ∆ + ∆ =
− − ∆ ∆ 1 1     (5) 
Model with interactions with TEA and RIG 
it t i G it r i it rig
it citr i it tea it pat it
c
sbrd it brd it
c
gdp it
G r RIG GDP
CITR TEA SBRD PAT SBRD BRD GDP VC
µ ϕ φ σ β β
β β β β β β
+ + + + + ∆ +
+ + + + ∆ + ∆ =
− − − ∆ ∆
) * (
) * (
1 1 1  (6) 
where ∆ represents the first logarithmic difference. In this equation, the parameters that are to be estimated 
are assumed to be constant across countries and over time; they are defined as follows (the expected signs 
are presented between parentheses): 
β ∆ gdp  The impact of GDP growth (+). 
β ∆ brd  The impact of business R&D expenditures growth rate (+). 
βsbrd  The impact of the level of business R&D capital stock (+). 
βpat  The impact of the number of triadic patents (+). 
βtea  The impact of the level of entrepreneurship on βsbrd (+). 
βcitr  The impact of the CITR (-). 
βrig  The impact of labour market rigidities on β ∆ gdp (-). 
βr  The impact of interest rate (?). 
A range of control variables is included in all the regressions.  
G  is a dummy equal to 1 for Germany in 1991, and 0 otherwise; in order to take into account the 
exogenous shock of the German unification.    7 
φi  are country dummies which take into account country-specific framework conditions that might 
affect VC intensity. 
ϕt  are time dummies which take into account exogenous shocks that are common to several countries, 
such as changes in exchange rates. 
The variables (for country i and time t) are defined as follows:   
VC  is the venture capital intensity, i.e. the VC funds
2 divided by GDP (Sources: EVCA and OECD). 
GDP  is the gross domestic product (Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators). 
BRD  is the business R&D expenditures (Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators). 
SBRD  is the business R&D capital stock. It has been computed using the perpetual inventory method from 
total intramural business R&D expenditures, in constant 1990 GDP prices and US PPPs (see 
appendix 1). The depreciation rate is 15%. Sensitivity analysis show that the results of the 
regressions do not change significantly with the chosen depreciation rate (Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe, 2002) (Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators). 
PAT  is the number of Triadic patents (Source: OECD). These patents have been applied at the USPTO, 
the Japanese Patent Office and the European Patent Office. We can therefore assume that they reflect 
patents with a very high value. 
CITR  is the corporate income tax rate (Source: OECD). 
RIG  is the employment protection index drawn up by the OECD (1994a) and based on the strength of the 
legal framework governing hiring and firing of employees. It is a measure of labour market rigidities. 
The countries are ranked from 1 to 20 with 20 being the most strictly regulated. Since the indicator is 
fixed over time, it is introduced in interaction with GDP. 
TEA  is the Total Entrepreneurship Activity (TEA)-index computed by adding the proportion of adults 
involved in the creation of nascent firms and the proportion involved in new firms (Source: The 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2001). The variable is a ranking from 1 to 20. This measure of 
entrepreneurial activity can be meaningfully used for international comparisons. 
r  is the one-year national deposit rate (Source: IMF) or the long-term national interest rate (10 years, 
Source: OECD). 
 
The estimates are performed with a panel data set of 16 OECD countries over the period 1990-1998. These 
16 countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. The period can vary across 
countries based on availability of information. Descriptive statistics of all the variables are presented in 
Table 2. The average value of the dependent variable (VC intensity) varies from 0.01 percent in Denmark to 
0.16 percent in Canada, as shown in the last column. 
 
                                                       
2 The European definition of VC is not exactly the same as the US one. For example, in Europe, the European Venture 
Capital Association included management buy-outs (MBOs) and management buy-ins (MBIs) in the definition of the 
VC. The management and the composition of the funds also differ in each country.   8 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (%) 
























  VC 
Intensity 
(GDP) 
   Growth rates (%)   Average   %  Shares 
AU 1995-98  3.47  -4.64  5.79  6.87 -13.95 -15.67   0.47  15.2  4    0.09 
BE  1990-98  1.68  5.28  3.72 6.77  -8.51  -9.09    0.45  4.5  17   0.06 
CA 1995-98  3.14  4.00  4.95  10.47  -11.06 -13.14   0.40  12.2  3    0.16 
DK 1990-98  2.53  7.06  7.18  7.11 -11.15  -8.91    0.47  7.6  5    0.01 
FI 1990-98  1.55  8.58  7.33  12.36  -14.21 -11.89   0.49  12.5  10   0.04 
FR  1990-98  1.42  0.70  2.80 0.89  -4.13  -9.08    0.46  5.0  14   0.04 
GE  1990-98  2.94  -0.05  1.43 4.23  -10.62  -7.71    0.63  6.9  15   0.04 
IR 1990-97  7.03  17.37  15.49  4.60  -31.18 -6.84  0.10  9.1  12    0.05 
IT  1990-98  1.28  -0.65  2.34 1.20  -9.13  -11.97    0.43  8.1  20   0.03 
JP 1994-98  0.94  4.86  3.55  5.83  -36.87 -22.91   0.55  5.7  8   0.02 
NL 1990-98  2.55  2.17  1.78  3.63 -0.82  -7.87   0.45  6.4  9    0.10 
NO 1990-97  3.64  3.81  3.23  11.14  -13.07  -8.15    0.51  10.9  11    0.06 
SP 1990-98  2.19  1.06  4.07  4.83 -14.93 -12.90  0.34  6.6  19    0.03 
SW 1990-97  0.95  8.19  5.75  12.00  -17.88  -9.36    0.52  6.6  13    0.03 
UK 1990-98  2.15  -0.85  0.79  2.99 -12.07  -9.06    0.44  6.9  7    0.08 
US 1990-98  3.07  3.25  2.72  3.05 -4.86  -5.88  0.43  16.7  1    0.08 
Sources: OECD, MSTI, EVCA and own calculations 
 
4. Empirical  results 
Each variable of equation (5) has first been included separately in the empirical model. The estimated 
parameters are presented in Table 3. All variables have the expected impact as far as their sign and 
significance is concerned. Results concerning the growth rate of GDP (Table 3, column 1) are in line with 
those of Gompers and Lerner (1998) for the US but do not confirm the non-significant impact obtained by 
Jeng and Wells (2000). Several tests have been carried out in order to determine whether a time lag is 
necessary. However, only the contemporaneous GDP growth rate has a significant impact on VC intensity.  
Both one-year and ten-year interest rates have a positive and significant impact, suggesting that the demand 
effect of interest rates is stronger than the supply effect. Since entrepreneurs must have a shorter vision of 
financial constraints (or return) than fund providers, we would have expected a negative impact of the long-
term interest rate. However, the adjusted R-squared is the smallest with the ten-year interest rate. Column 4 
of Table 3 reports a variable representing the difference between the long-term and short-term interest rates. 
The negative and significant impact suggests a stronger supply-side effect. What matters is not only the level 
of the long-term interest rate but also the difference between the long-term and short-term rates. The larger 
this difference, the less venture fund providers would be attracted towards risky investment. 
The three variables representing technological opportunity and research efforts play a significant role in 
determining VC intensity. The strong and positive impact of the growth rate of business R&D expenditures, 
the Business R&D capital stock and the number of triadic patents show that the demand of VC is sensitive to   9 
the dynamics of research activities, to the available stock of knowledge and to the level of innovation output, 
as proxied by the number of high value patents. 
It is worth noticing that the three variables that yield the highest adjusted R-squared are the short-term 
interest rate, the growth of business R&D investment and the difference between the long-term and short-
term interest rates. Then come the GDP growth rate, the stock of knowledge and the number of triadic 
patents. The short-term cost of money and technological opportunity seem to be the strongest drivers of VC. 
High taxation of income reduces the relative level of VC probably due to an induced lower entrepreneurial 
will. 
Table 4 presents the results of the estimates with several variables introduced simultaneously in the model. 
The sign and significance of the impact of all these variables remain unchanged when they are introduced 
simultaneously in the model. Columns 1 to 3 present the basic model described in equation (5), with different 
indicators for the interest rates.  
The short-term interest rate (column 1) is still highly significant, whereas the long-term interest rate is no 
more significant (column 2), probably due to the simultaneous introduction of GDP growth in the model. 
However, the difference between short-term and long-term interest rates has a significant and negative 
impact (column 3). It seems therefore that the short-term cost of capital and its difference with the long-term 
cost play a more important role in explaining the intensity of VC. These results witness a stronger influence 
of the short-term cost of capital on the demand side (entrepreneurs) than on the supply side (investors). 
However, the larger the difference between long-term and short-term interest rates, the lower the VC 
intensity. 
As predicted, corporate income tax rate has a negative impact on the VC intensity and the parameters 
associated with the three variables of technological opportunity and research efforts (the growth rate of 
business R&D expenditures, the business R&D capital stock and the number of triadic patents) are positive 
and significant. This result about triadic patents is consistent with the results of Kortum and Lerner (1998) 
who show that a surge of patents may increase the VC fundraising. In other words, the property of highly 
valued intellectual assets (triadic patents are associated with a much higher value than the patents applied 
only in one country or region) seems to stimulate the demand for VC.  
The remaining columns test other specifications described in equation (6), with two interaction variables 
representing a country’s entrepreneurial environment. The index of labour market rigidities is first interacted 
with the GDP growth rate variable (see column 4). Results show that the impact of GDP growth rate on the 
VC intensity is composed of a fixed and significant component (0.0067) and a country specific component 
that depends on labour market rigidities (-0.00047). The positive impact of GDP on the VC intensity is 
therefore reduced in countries with high labour market rigidities. Jeng and Wells (2000) obtain a similar 
result but only for early stage funding. Over the threshold of 14.2 in the index of labour market rigidities, the 
impact of GDP growth becomes negative.  
The level of entrepreneurship is interacted in a similar way with the stock of available knowledge (the R&D 
capital stock, in column 5). Estimates indicate that the impact of the R&D capital stock on the VC intensity 
is composed of a fixed negative component and a country specific component that depends on the relative 
level of entrepreneurship (TEA): the higher the level of entrepreneurship, the stronger the impact of the 
business R&D capital stock on VC intensity. In order to have a positive impact of the available stock of 
knowledge on VC performances, a minimum level of entrepreneurship is required. The estimated parameters 
suggest that the impact of the business R&D capital stock on the VC intensity becomes positive and 
significant above a threshold of 12.8 in the TEA index (level of entrepreneurship). 
   10 
 
Table 3: Estimation results of the VC intensity, single explanatory variables 
Dependent variable: VC intensity (VC/GDP) 
   GLS GLS  GLS GLS GLS GLS  GLS  GLS 
Regressions    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Economic variables          
GDP growth rate  it GDP ∆  
0.003*** 
(3.32) 
       
One-year Interest rate  it r    
0.00004*** 
(3.26) 
      
Long-Term Interest rate (10 years)  it r     
0.00004** 
(2.18) 
     
Log [r10/r1]  it r      
-0.0001*** 
(-3.05) 
    
Technological opportunity          
Business R&D investment growth rate (t-1)  1 − ∆ it BRD       
0.001*** 
(4.19) 
   









Entrepreneurial environment          
Corporate Income Tax Rate  it CITR          
-0.002*** 
(-3.20) 
Control variables          
German reunification dummy (t)    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-specific intercept    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies    Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Adjusted R-squared    0.726  0.755 0.628 0.737 0.742 0.713 0.682 0.669 
           
Note: Panel data, 16 OECD countries, 1990-98, 130 observations. * Indicates the parameters that are significant at a 10% probability threshold, ** 5% probability threshold and *** 1% 
probability threshold. All equations include country dummies (within estimates), time dummies, and a dummy variable for the German reunification. The econometric method is GLS.   11 
Table 4: Estimation results of the VC intensity, complete model and interactions 
Dependent variable: VC intensity (VC/GDP), GLS estimates 
                  
Regressions    1  2  3    4  5 6 7  8 
Economic variables                 


















One-year Interest rate  it r  
0.00003*** 
(2.70) 












Long-Term Interest rate (10 years)  it r    
0.00002 
(0.96) 
           
Log [r10/r1]  it r     
-0.0001*** 
(-3.35) 
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Control variables                 
German reunification dummy (t)    Yes Yes Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country-specific intercept    Yes Yes Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time dummies    Yes Yes Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                   
Adjusted R-squared    0.833  0.805  0.821    0.820  0.833 0.860 0.827  0.830 
                  
Note: Panel data, 16 OECD countries, 1990-98, 130 observations. 
∇ Indicates the parameters that are significant at a 15% probability threshold, * 10% probability threshold, ** 5% probability threshold and *** 
1% probability threshold. All equations include country dummies (within estimates), time dummies, and a dummy variable for the German reunification. The econometric method is GLS.   12 
The estimated parameters associated with the interaction between the two country-specific variables 
representing the entrepreneurial environment are stable in the subsequent models. Columns 6 to 8 show that 
the simultaneous introduction of the two indicators (RIG and TEA), and the use of short-term and long-term 
interest rates do not affect the results. The last column introduces simultaneously the short-term interest rate 
and the difference between the long-term and short-term interest rates. The non significant impact of the 
difference indicator suggests that what matters more is the short-term interest rate influence on the demand-
side of VC. 
 
Table 5a: Estimation results of the VC intensity, interactions with RIG 
Dependent variable: VC intensity (VC/GDP) 
   GLS GLS  GLS  GLS 
Regressions    1 2 3  4 
Economic variables        
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Labour Market Rigidities 1  i it RIG GDP * ∆  
-0.0005*** 
(-2.55) 
    













Control variables       
German reunification dummy (t)    Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Country-specific intercept    Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Time dummies    Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
         
Adjusted R-squared    0.820  0.840  0.814  0.844 
          
Note: Panel data, 16 OECD countries, 1990-98, 130 observations. 
∇ Indicates the parameters that are significant at a 15% 
probability threshold, * 10% probability threshold, ** 5% probability threshold and *** 1% probability threshold. All equations 
include country dummies (within estimates), time dummies, and a dummy variable for the German reunification. The econometric 
method is GLS. 
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We investigate more thoroughly the role of the two country-specific variables representing the 
entrepreneurial environment in tables 5a and 5b. The two indexes have been interacted with the GDP growth 
rate and each of the three variables of technological opportunity and research efforts. Table 5a presents the 
estimated parameters related to the interaction between labour market rigidities and the four variables. There 
is a negative and significant effect of RIG on the impact of the GDP growth rate, the growth rate of R&D 
outlays and the stock of business R&D. The impact of triadic patents is not really affected by labour market 
rigidities. 
Figure 1 illustrates the results of the estimates presented in table 5a. It shows how the level of labour market 
rigidities affects the impact of three determinants of VC. For instance, the impact of the growth rate of R&D 
expenses is always positive but declining as RIG increases. The effect of these rigidities on the stock of 
knowledge (SBRD) and on the GDP growth rate is steeper, as they become negative over a threshold of 
about 13 to 14 in the index of labour market rigidities. 
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Estimated impact of GDP growth, left-hand scale
Estimated impact of R&D capital stock, right-hand scale
Estimated impact of R&D growth, 
left-hand scale
 
Note: Estimated impact of the growth rate of GDP, the growth rate of business R&D expenditure and the stock of knowledge on VC 
intensity, according to the level of labour market rigidities. See table 5a, columns 1 to 3. 
 
Table 5b presents the estimated parameters related to the interaction between the level of entrepreneurship 
(TEA) and the four variables. The interaction term is positive and significant with the R&D growth rate and 
the business R&D capital stock (see columns 2 and 3). With the lower level of entrepreneurship, the growth 
rate of business R&D expenditures would have no impact on the VC intensity. The larger the level of   14 
entrepreneurship is, the larger the impact of business R&D expenditures. In other words, there must be a 
minimum level of entrepreneurship in order to spur the demand for VC. The business R&D capital stock has 
a significant impact on VC intensity only above a threshold of about 12 in the index of entrepreneurship.  
 
Table 5b: Estimation results of the VC intensity, interactions with TEA 
Dependent variable: VC intensity (VC/GDP) 
   GLS GLS  GLS  GLS 
Regressions    1 2 3  4 
Economic variables        
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Level of entrepreneurship 1  i it TEA GDP * ∆  
0.0003 
(1.15) 
    










Level of entrepreneurship 4  i it TEA PAT *      
0.00004 
(1.34) 
Control variables       
German reunification dummy (t)    Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Country-specific intercept    Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Time dummies    Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
         
Adjusted R-squared    0.837  0.837  0.833  0.834 
          
Note: Panel data, 16 OECD countries, 1990-98, 130 observations. 
∇ Indicates the parameters that are significant at a 15% 
probability threshold, * 10% probability threshold, ** 5% probability threshold and *** 1% probability threshold. All equations 
include country dummies (within estimates), time dummies, and a dummy variable for the German reunification. The econometric 
method is GLS. 
 
Table 6 summarizes the main findings of our empirical investigation and compares them with the results 
obtained by Jeng and Wells (2000) and Gompers and Lerner (1998). The cyclicality of VC with respect to 
GDP growth confirms both our expectation and the results of Gompers and Lerner (1998). Jeng and Wells 
(2000) did not find any significant effect partly because of the structure of their dataset (cross section of 
countries) and partly because of the use of the IPO variable.   15 
Concerning the cost of capital, we confirm the positive impact of the short-term interest rate obtained by 
Gompers and Lerner (1998) at the aggregate level. We also show that the difference between the long-term 
interest rate and the short-term interest rate has a negative and significant impact on the VC intensity. 
Labour market rigidities and the corporate income tax rate are two factors that reduce the intensity of VC. On 
the other hand, a strong entrepreneurial culture and more intense technological opportunities and research 
efforts improve the positive effect of the stock of knowledge and GDP growth on the VC intensity. 
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5. Concluding  Remarks 
This paper aims at contributing to the literature on the determinants of VC. Our contribution consists in (1) 
developing a theoretical model that takes into account the supply-side and demand-side variables to explain 
VC intensity; and (2) introducing simultaneously traditional determinants of VC and new potential 
determinants like the cost of capital, the level of entrepreneurship, and novel proxies aiming at measuring 
technological opportunity. Empirical results can be summarized as follows. 
Interest rates have a significant impact on VC intensity. Whereas short-term interest rates influence 
positively the relative level of VC via a strong demand-side effect, the difference between long-term and 
short-term interest rates has the opposite impact, via a stronger supply-side effect. Long term interest rates do 
not affect significantly the equilibrium level of VC. 
We show that the impact of corporate income tax rates on VC investment is negative. In other words, high 
corporate income tax rates reduce the relative level of VC investment across countries and over time.  
VC is highly cyclical. It follows a similar evolution than GDP growth rate. In periods of high growth, the 
flow of venture capital outperforms the GDP growth rate, and vice versa. This cyclicality is reduced by the 
degree of labour market rigidities. A high level of labour market rigidity reduces the positive impact of GDP 
growth on VC intensity, as well as the positive impact of the knowledge capital stock and of the growth in 
business R&D. 
We also show that indicators of technological opportunity, such as the growth rate of R&D investment, the 
available stock of knowledge and the number of high value patents (triadic patents), influence significantly a 
country’s investment in VC. The positive impact of the stock of knowledge is strongly reinforced in the 
countries were the rate of entrepreneurship is very high. 
One important policy implication that emerges from these results is that in order to stimulate VC in a country, 
demand-side factors have to be taken into account. The most important factors affecting the demand of VC 
are the stock of knowledge, innovative outputs, business R&D, the corporate income tax rate and short-term 
interest rates. In addition, labour market rigidities and the level of entrepreneurship do play an important role. 
Changing these factors would require adjustment in structural policies (labour market and education), whose 
impact can only appear in the long term. 
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APPENDIX 1: Calculation of the variables 
Business R&D capital stocks 
R&D capital stocks are calculated following the perpetual inventory method. The stock at time t is equal to 
the new investment at time t plus the stock at time t-1 minus depreciation: 
1 ) 1 ( − − + = t t t SR r SR δ           ( A 1 . 1 )  




1 + − + − + − + = − − − t t t t t r r r r SR δ δ δ       ( A 1 . 2 )  
To construct the initial stock we assume a constant annual rate of growth of the past investments,  
... ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
3 3 2 2 + − + − + − + = t t t t t r r r r SR λ δ λ δ λ δ       ( A 1 . 3 )  





SR           ( A 1 . 4 )  
where     t SR   =  R&D capital stock at time t. 
   t r   =  R&D investment at time t. 







and   is the mean annual rate of growth of  t r  . 
This formula has been used to calculate the business R&D capital stock (SBRD). 
 